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John W. R. Murray*
Introduction
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court ruled that an em-
ployee could not be forced to arbitrate his discrimination claim
against his employer pursuant to his union's collective bargaining
agreement.' The decision, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,2 was
widely viewed as foreclosing entirely agreements to arbitrate em-
ployee discrimination claims. Seventeen years later, however, the
Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,3 which
held enforceable an agreement by an employee to submit to arbi-
tration all statutory discrimination claims against his employer.4
Gilmer apparently limited Gardner-Denver to arbitration clauses
in collective bargaining agreements, and though Gilmer involved
an employee in the securities industry, many lower courts have
read the decision as signaling approval of arbitration provisions in
employment contracts both within and outside of the securities
context.' These developments have increasingly encouraged em-
ployers to require employees, as a condition of employment, to
agree to such provisions in individual employment contracts and
applications.6
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1999; A.B., History,
Dartmouth College, 1994. I would like to thank my parents, James and Mary Jane
Murray, and grandparents, Patrick and Belinda Murray and John and Eileen Riordan,
for their ongoing support during my education.
1. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
2. Id.
3. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
4. See id. at 35.
5. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998); Cole v.
Burns Int'l Security Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Great Western Mortgage
Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 299 (1997); Pat-
terson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Communi-
cations, 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996); Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50
(7th Cir. 1996); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995).
6. See John P. Furfaro and Maury B. Josephson, Employment Arbitration, N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 11, 1997, at 3.
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Proponents of mandatory arbitration agreements contend that
arbitration is a cheaper, more expeditious forum for the resolution
of discrimination claims, offering advantages to both employer and
employee.7 The growing popularity of mandatory arbitration, how-
ever, has drawn intense criticism from opponents, including the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), who
contend that the informal arbitral procedure is ill-suited to carry
out the scrupulous enforcement of federal discrimination laws as
per congressional design. 8 Critics are equally troubled by the
mandatory nature of these agreements, which they characterize as
forcing prospective employees, with no real bargaining power, to
sign away their statutory rights.9
The dispute has been played out in the lower courts, yielding a
broad range of decisions on the proper application of Gilmer.10
While several circuit courts have enforced mandatory arbitration
agreements, a number of circuit and district courts have imposed
additional safeguards designed to protect employees, including the
requirement that mandatory arbitration clauses be sufficiently spe-
cific, and that the arbitration itself provide employees with basic
due process protections.1 ' Still other courts have held that Gilmer
has been overruled by subsequent congressional legislation, which
they construe as barring mandatory arbitration provisions
altogether.1 2
Part I of this Note analyzes the treatment of mandatory arbitra-
tion by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, both leading
up to and since Gilmer. Part II examines the principal arguments
in favor of mandatory arbitration agreements, as well as the coun-
tervailing position, including the stance of the EEOC. Part III ar-
gues that in view of the unique potential of mandatory arbitration
to further the policies underlying federal discrimination statutes,
7. See, e.g., Martin J. Oppenheimer & Cameron Johnstone, A Management Per-
spective: Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Are An Effective Alternative to Employ-
ment Litigation, 52 Disp. RESOL. J. 19 (1997).
8. See, e.g., Excerpts from the Text: EEOC Rejects Mandatory Binding Employ-
ment Arbitration, 52 Disp. RESOL. J. 11 (1997) (reprinting EEOC Notice No. 915.002,
July 10, 1997).
9. See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims:
Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAn. L.J. 1, 29 (1996).
10. See infra Part I.C.1-2 and I.D.
11. See, e.g., Cole, 105 F.3d at 1488; (setting forth minimum due process require-
ments for arbitration proceedings); Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305 (holding invalid an arbitration
clause that failed to specify the types of disputes covered).
12. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (1998); Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998).
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the Supreme Court should resolve the conflict in favor of
mandatory arbitration. However, in order to ensure that arbitra-
tion lives up to its promise, the Court also should require that arbi-
tration proceedings incorporate fundamental procedural
protections for employees, as distinguished from the present
scheme in which arbitrators may elect to do so on a purely volun-
tary basis.
I. The Law Pertaining to Arbitration of Discrimination Claims
A. Arbitration Disfavored: Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
The Supreme Court's first assessment of arbitration as a forum
for discrimination claims in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. was
a highly skeptical one.' 3 In reversing the dismissal of the plaintiff's
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'4 the
Supreme Court found "no suggestion in the statutory scheme that
a prior arbitral decision . . . forecloses an individual's right to
sue." 15 First, the Court noted that Title VII was enacted for the
purpose of expanding the remedies available to discrimination
plaintiffs.16 It followed, the Court reasoned, that an individual
could not relinquish his right to a private action under Title VII by
submitting to arbitration.'7 Second, in ruling that Alexander's
union lacked the authority to waive his right to sue under its collec-
tive bargaining agreement ("CBA"), the Court emphasized the dis-
cord between the union's role of safeguarding the collective rights
of all unionized employees, and the role of Title VII in vindicating
the individual right of each employee to equal employment oppor-
13. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Alexander was an African-American who had worked as a
drill operator at the defendant's plant. After the company fired him for allegedly
producing defective parts, Alexander filed a grievance pursuant to the collective bar-
gaining agreement ("CBA") in force between the company and Alexander's union.
The agreement included an arbitration clause, which required that the dispute, if not
resolved through the grievance procedure, be remitted to arbitration, the result .of
which was to be "final and binding upon the Company, the Union, and any employee
or employees involved." Id. at 38-42. After the arbitrator ruled in the company's
favor, see id. at 42-43, Alexander brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994) [hereinafter Title VII]. See Gardner-Denver,
415 U.S. at 43. The District Court, holding that Alexander was bound by the arbitra-
tion provision, granted summary judgment for the company, and the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. See 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971); 466 F.2d 1209
(10th Cir. 1972).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
15. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 47.
16. See id. at 47-48.
17. See id. at 48-49.
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tunity. 18 "Of necessity, the rights conferred [by Title VII] can form
no part of the collective bargaining process since waiver of these
rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind
Title VII," the Court determined. 19
Finally, the Court cast doubt on the structural competence of ar-
bitration as a means for resolving discrimination claims. 20 The
Court's discomfort stemmed in part from what it viewed as "the
special role of the arbitrator, whose task is to effectuate the intent
of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted legisla-
tion."' 21 Most significantly, however, the Court expressed doubt as
to the capacity of arbitration to provide discrimination plaintiffs
with adequate due process protections.22 Specifically, the Court
identified a number of procedural shortcomings: the sparseness of
the record of arbitration proceedings relative to that of judicial
proceedings, the non-applicability of the rules of evidence, and the
unavailability of "rights and procedures" typical of civil trials such
as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testi-
mony under oath.23 It is this lack of confidence in the ability of the
arbitral process to safeguard fundamental rights that remains the
most influential basis of the Gardner-Denver decision, as it has pro-
vided the highest form of judicial validation for the principal mis-
giving of courts and commentators on both sides of the issue.
B. Gardner-Denver Restricted: The Gilmer Decision
The Gardner-Denver Court had appeared to foreclose any role
for arbitration in the resolution of discrimination claims. By the
mid-1980s, however, the Supreme Court had largely overcome its
uneasiness. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-
outh,24 the Court enforced an agreement to arbitrate an antitrust
dispute under the Sherman Act, reasoning that in submitting to ar-
bitration, "a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded
by the statute, it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial forum. 25
18. See id. at 51.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 56-59.
21. Id. at 56-57.
22. See id. at 57-58.
23. Id. at 57-58. The Court further suggested that heightening procedural safe-
guards in arbitration was an unfeasible solution, because this would rob arbitration of
its most attractive characteristic, i.e., its informality. See id. at 58-59.
24. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
25. Id. at 640.
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The Court extended this receptivity to the arbitration of discrim-
ination claims in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.26 In af-
firming the Fourth Circuit's decision allowing the plaintiff's claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA"), 27 the Court, in remarkable contrast to its prior evalua-
tion, rejected the contention that adjudication alone was capable of
tending the social policies that the ADEA was intended to 'ad-
vance. 28 "[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vin-
dicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,
the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function. 29
Moreover, the Court imposed upon employers the burden of
showing that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the
claim at issue.3" Here, the Court held, nothing in the text or legis-
lative history of the ADEA evidenced an intent that the courts be
the sole forum for resolution of ADEA claims. 31 Nor did arbitra-
tion of statutory claims pose a threat to the EEOC's enforcement
role, given that employees remained free to file charges with the
Commission.32
Most importantly, in dismissing Gilmer's due process arguments,
the Court appeared to refute almost directly the Gardner-Denver
Court's dim assessment of the fitness of arbitration for handling
statutory claims.33 Rejecting Gilmer's contention that arbitration
26. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Gilmer, who had been a financial services manager for
Interstate, alleged that he was terminated because of his age (sixty-two at the time of
suit) in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 et seq. (1994) [hereinafter ADEA]. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24. Gilmer's
employment with Interstate had required him to file with the New York Stock Ex-
change ("NYSE") a "U-4" registration application, in which he agreed to arbitrate
"any dispute, claim, or controversy" arising between him and Interstate "that is re-
quired to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations"
with which he registered. Id. at 23. One of those NYSE rules provided for arbitration
of "[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any member or mem-
ber organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such
registered representative." Id. Gilmer nonetheless filed suit in federal court. The
District Court, relying on Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974), denied Interstate's
motion to compel arbitration, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on
the ground that in enacting the ADEA, Congress had never intended to bar arbitra-
tion of ADEA claims. See 895 F.2d 195, 197 (1990).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
28. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
29. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
30. See id. at 29 and 35.
31. See id. at 29.
32. See id. at 28.
33. See id. at 30-32.
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panels are inclined to be biased in favor of employers, the Court
noted that under NYSE rules, the parties were entitled to extensive
information about arbitrators, could make peremptory and for
cause challenges, and that arbitrators were required to disclose any
conflicts of interest.34 The Court also accorded little weight to Gil-
mer's argument that the limited availability of discovery in arbitra-
tion would make it unduly burdensome for plaintiffs to prove
ADEA claims.35 It was unlikely, the Court noted, that ADEA
claims required more extensive discovery than other statutory
causes of action held to be arbitrable by the Court, such as RICO
and antitrust claims.36 Moreover, the lesser extent of discovery in
arbitration was counterbalanced by the arbitrator's freedom from
the rules of evidence.37 Though directed at the ADEA claim at
issue, the Court's rationale dealt a grave blow to the argument that
arbitration per se is an inadequate mechanism for the redress of
civil rights claims.
Having made a near diametric reversal in its appraisal, the Court
distinguished Gardner-Denver on the ground that it involved the
issue of "whether arbitration of contract-based claims" barred later
judicial resolution of statutory claims. 38 Gilmer, by comparison,
centered upon the enforceability of the arbitration agreement it-
self.39 Presumably because the plaintiff's union in Gardner-Denver
could not validly waive his right to sue under the collective bar-
gaining agreement in that case, the Gilmer Court held that the
plaintiff in Gardner-Denver, in contrast to Gilmer, had never actu-
ally waived his right to sue.4" In addition, unlike Gardner-Denver,
Gilmer's waiver of his right to sue was not given pursuant to a
CBA, so that the tension between collective and individual rights, a
primary concern of the Gardner-Denver Court, was not implicated
here.41
34. See id. at 30.
35. See id. at 31.
36. See id. at 31.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 35.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. In addition, the Court observed that Gardner-Denver, in contrast to
Gilmer, was not decided under the Federal Arbitration Act, which reflects "a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Id.
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C. Mandatory Arbitration Extended: Gilmer in the Circuits
1. Due Process Concerns
Gilmer left unanswered the question of whether mandatory em-
ployment arbitration agreements were valid. The majority of cir-
cuits to address the issue have ruled in the affirmative, compelling
employees to submit their discrimination claims to arbitration
under the terms of their employment contracts.42
Several of those courts, however, have signaled a continuing con-
cern with the issue of due process.43 Consequently, a number of
courts have moved beyond Gilmer in imposing a variety of proce-
dural requirements in discrimination cases. 4 One such court, the
District of Columbia Circuit in Cole v. Burns International Security
Services,45 enumerated several potential procedural inequities in
the arbitration of individual statutory claims: that only employers
are "repeat players" in the arbitration process, affording them su-
perior knowledge in selecting arbitrators; that the lack of public
disclosure of arbitration awards could favor employers over indi-
viduals and make it difficult for plaintiffs to establish a pattern of
discrimination; that employers are free to structure arbitration to
their advantage in the contracts that they draft; and that many arbi-
trators are non-lawyers, unable to engage in the legal analysis re-
quired in statutory cases. 46
Pointing out that the Supreme Court's endorsement of arbitra-
tion "has been based on the assumption that 'competent, conscien-
tious, and impartial arbitrators' will be available to decide these
cases," the Court set forth several requirements to preserve the va-
lidity of that premise.47 These include the criteria that arbitrators
(1) educate themselves about that law, (2) follow precedent and
adopt an attitude of judicial restraint when entering undefined ar-
eas of the law, (3) actively ensure that the record is sufficiently
developed and "procedural fairness is provided," and that (4) ap-
pointing agencies such as the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") ensure that only persons meeting these requirements are
added to arbitrator or panel lists. 48 Additionally, the Court held
42. See supra note 5.
43. See, e.g., Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998); Cole, 105
F.3d 1465; Lai, 42 F.3d 1299.
44. See supra note 11.
45. 105 F.3d 1465 (1997).
46. See id. at 1476-77.
47. Id. at 1488.
48. See id.
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that employers are to bear the entire cost of mandatory arbitration,
given that "arbitration has been imposed by the employer and oc-
curs only at the option of the employer. 49
The Ninth Circuit, focusing on the agreement to arbitrate rather
than the arbitration proceeding, has held that employers must dis-
close with a high degree of specificity the identity and nature of the
rights that they require employees to waive.5 Prudential Insurance
Company of America v. Lai,5" like Gilmer,52 involved the arbitra-
tion provision in the U-4 securities industry registration applica-
tion.53 The form contained an agreement "to arbitrate any dispute,
claim or controversy that ... is required to be arbitrated under the
rules, constitutions, or bylaws of the organizations with which I
register. '5 4 The plaintiffs later registered with the National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), which required that dis-
putes "arising in connection with the business" of its members be
arbitrated."
Reading Gilmer as mandating that a discrimination plaintiff
"may only be forced to forego her claims if she has knowingly
agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration," the Court held that
the U-4 and NASD provisions failed to meet this standard, on the
ground that neither described the specific types of disputes subject
to arbitration. 6 In a subsequent case, the Court clarified the
"knowing waiver" requirement as meaning that an arbitration pro-
vision must specifically identify the statutory claims subject to arbi-
tration.57 The Fifth Circuit, however, has taken a less stringent
view, holding that a catchall phrase requiring arbitration of "other
disputes" between employer and employee was sufficient to cover
a plaintiff's Title VII claim.58
More generally, the Second Circuit has underscored the role of
judicial scrutiny of arbitration proceedings in discrimination
49. Id. at 1485.
50. See Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305; Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 113 F.3d 1104,
1106-07 (9th Cir. 1997).
51. 42 F.3d 1299 (1994).
52. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
53. See Lai, 42 F.3d at 1301.
54. Id.
55. Id. The NASD has since abandoned its mandatory arbitration policy, effective
Jan. 1, 1999. See Bertrand C. Sellier and Margaret A. Dale, Rigorous Scrutiny of
Arbitration Decisions: Employment Law Update, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 1998, at 5.
56. Id. at 1305. The Seventh Circuit had earlier held the NASD provision at issue
in Lai inapplicable to employment disputes. See Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood,
993 F.2d 1253, 1254-55 (1993).
57. See Renteria, 113 F.3d at 1106-07.
58. See Rojas, 87 F.3d at 746.
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cases.59 The precise issue in Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc. 60 was
whether to overturn an arbitrator's decision in an ADEA case ren-
dered in favor of the employer, despite overwhelming evidence to
the contrary. 61 In finding that the decision-was in "manifest disre-
gard" of the law, the Court emphasized the critical importance of
procedural safeguards in discrimination cases.62 Noting that Gil-
mer rested on the assumption that "the claimant would not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute, [and] that the arbitra-
tion agreement simply changed the forum for enforcement of those
rights," the Court remarked that the instant case "put[ ] those as-
sumptions to the test."' 63 The Cole Court had reached a similar
conclusion, observing that the same rationale in Gilmer "[is] valid
only if judicial review under the 'manifest disregard of the law'
standard is sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have
properly interpreted and applied statutory law."'64 Halligan, to-
gether with Cole and Lai, thus may be read to stand for the propo-
sition that arbitration of statutory rights merits an especially
vigilant regard for procedural fairness, both by arbitrators as well
as the courts reviewing them.
2. CBAs and Individual Employment Contracts Distinguished
Gilmer effectively divided employees subject to mandatory arbi-
tration agreements into two classes: unionized and non-union-
ized.65 Because the Court appeared to leave intact the core
holding of Gardner-Denver, employees in the former category, cov-
ered by CBAs, presumably still were barred from waiving their
right to sue, while such agreements between employers and non-
union employees were held valid.66
The Fourth Circuit, however, has erased the union distinction al-
together, applying Gilmer to agreements to arbitrate by unionized
and non-unionized employees alike.67 In Austin v. Owens-Brock-
way Glass Container, Inc. ,68 the District Court required a dis-
charged employee to arbitrate her claims under Title VII and the
59. See Halligan, 148 F.3d 197.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 198-200.
62. See id. at 204.
63. Id.
64. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1487.
65. See Norris Case, Arbitration of Workplace Discrimination Claims: Federal Law
and Compulsory Arbitration, 14" ToURo L. REV. 839, 851 (1998).
66. See id.
67. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (1996).
68. Id.
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Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")6 9 as provided under the
CBA between her union and Owens-Brockway.7" In affirming, the
Fourth Circuit determined that
[w]hether the dispute arises under a contract of employment
growing out of [a] securities registration application, a simple
employment contract, or a collective bargaining agreement, an
agreement has yet been made to arbitrate the dispute. So long
as the agreement is voluntary, it is valid, and we are of opinion it
should be enforced.71
The Court further reasoned that the right to bring a private ac-
tion was indistinguishable from other rights that unions validly may
bargain away, such as the right to strike.72 "The right to arbitrate is
a term or condition of employment, and as such, the union may
bargain for this right. 73
The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue, but left it un-
resolved. In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,'M the
Court refused to enforce an arbitration provision in a CBA, but on
different grounds than in Gardner-Denver.71 The Court held first
that the presumption of arbitrability pursuant to a CBA does not
extend to statutory claims, 76 and second, that any waiver of an em-
ployee's right to sue under a CBA must be "clear and unmistaka-
ble."'77 Because the waiver at issue fell short of this standard, the
Court deemed it unnecessary to decide the question of whether
such a waiver would be enforceable.78 The continuing validity of
Gardner-Denver thus remains indeterminate.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994).
70. 844 F. Supp. 1103, 1106-07 (W.D. Va. 1994).
71. Austin, 78 F.3d at 885.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. 119 S.Ct. 391 (1998).
75. See infra Part I.A.
76. See Wright, 119 S.Ct. at 395-96. The Court commented that the presumption
"does not extend beyond the reach of the principal rationale that justifies it, which is
that arbitrators are in a better position that courts to interpret the terms of a CBA...
The cause of action Wright asserts arises not out of contract, but out of the ADA, and
is distinct from any right conferred by the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at
396.
77. Id. at 396.
78. See id. at 397.
290
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D. Gilmer Preempted? The 1991 Civil Rights Act and
Mandatory Arbitration
Congress addressed the question of arbitration and discrimina-
tion claims directly, if ambiguously, in the Civil Rights and Wo-
men's Equity in Employment Act of 1991 ("1991 Civil Rights
Act"),79 which was passed as an amendment to Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act80 as well as the ADEA.81 Section 118 of the
Act encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution in Title
VII and ADEA cases "where appropriate and to the extent au-
thorized by law."'82 The ADA, passed one year earlier, contains
nearly identical language.83 Left unclear, however, was the ques-
tion of whether Congress intended by these provisions to endorse
Gilmer, and thus implicitly approve mandatory agreements to arbi-
trate discrimination claims, or whether these provisions apply only
to voluntary agreements entered into after a dispute has arisen.84
This first judicial adoption of the latter position emerged from a
Massachusetts district court in Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. (recently reversed by the First Circuit). 85 The
Court relied heavily upon the legislative history of the Act, includ-
ing the accompanying House Education and Labor Committee Re-
port,86 which advised that "any agreement to submit disputed
issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargain-
ing agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the
affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provi-
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991) (codi-
fied as a historical and statutory note).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212. The section provides: "Where appropriate and to the
extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including
settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials,
and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter." Id.
84. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1189; EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F.
Supp. 500, 503 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
85. 995 F. Supp. 190 (1998). The decision was reversed by the First Circuit shortly
prior to publication of this Note. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., No. 98-1246, 1998 WL 880910, *7-*9 (1st Cir., Dec. 22, 1998). The Court
determined that the legislative history relied upon by the district court was "insuffi-
cient to overcome the presumption in favor of arbitration which Gilmer establishes."
Id. at *7. In addition, the Court viewed the persistent failure of Congress to pass
legislation that would bar mandatory arbitration provisions as indicative of an intent
to approve such agreements. See id.
86. H.R. REP. No. 40(I), 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 1991.
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sions of Title VII. '' 87 In other words, Congress intended that the
1991 Civil Rights Act preclude employers from requiring employ-
ees to arbitrate their Title VII claims. 88
Additionally, the Court pointed out that Gilmer was not decided
until several months after the Act had been finalized, deducing that
Congress could not have intended to endorse a case that it had no
occasion to consider.89 Rather, Congress could only have sought to
codify what it viewed as the generally accepted pre-Gilmer rule
that mandatory agreements to arbitrate were unenforceable. 90
Four months later, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar result. In
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.,9 the Court premised its
holding on what it perceived as the core purpose of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act: to "expand employees' rights and 'to increase the pos-
sible remedies available to civil rights plaintiffs."' 92 It would thus
be paradoxical, the Court stated,
to conclude that in the very Act of which the primary purpose
was to to strengthen existing protections and remedies... Con-
gress encouraged the use of a process whereby employers condi-
tion employment on their prospective employees surrendering
their rights to a judicial forum ... and force those employees to
submit all such claims to compulsory arbitration.93
To remain consistent with congressional intent, the Court deter-
mined that the qualifier "where appropriate" in Section 118 should
be read to mean "where arbitration furthers the purpose and ob-
jective of the Act - by affording victims of discrimination an oppor-
tunity to present their claims in an alternative forum, a forum that
they find desirable - not by forcing an unwanted forum upon
them. " 9 4
The First, Third, and Fourth Circuits have flatly rejected this con-
struction of the 1991 Act.95 Acknowledging the Education and La-
87. Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 201 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 40(I) 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1991).
88. See id.
89. See id. at 203.
90. See id.
91. 144 F.3d 1182 (1998).
92. Id. at 1192 (quoting Lai, 42 F.3d at 1304).
93. Id. at 1192-93 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 40(11) at 1).
94. Id. at 1194.
95. See Rosenberg, 1998 WL 880910, *7-*9 (1st Cir. 1998); Seus v. John Nuveen &
Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that the House Committee Re-
port "cannot be 'interpreted' to mean that the [Federal Arbitration Act] is impliedly
repealed with respect to agreements to arbitrate Title VII and ADEA claims that will
arise in the future"); Austin, 78 F.3d at 880-82 (4th Cir. 1996).
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bor Committee's interpretation, the Fourth Circuit nevertheless
remarked that the "committee's belief is not dispositive of what
Congress intended. ' 96 To hold to the contrary would require that
"Gilmer has no effect at all and that Alexander is still the law ....
We do not think Congress intended to return to the old law."97
A district court in Michigan has taken a different approach to
the same result, construing the legislative history as consistent with
mandatory arbitration.98 In considering a statement by the chair-
man of the Education and Labor Committee that Section 118 does
not cover "coercive attempts to force employees to forego statu-
tory rights," the court reasoned that mandatory arbitration, rather
than requiring employees to forfeit such rights, "only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum."99 More-
over, the court rejected the assertion that the agreement involved
"force" within the usage of the Committee. 00 "If [the employee]
disagreed with anything contained in the application she was free
to simply look elsewhere for employment. 10 1
The Supreme Court's recent denial of certiorari in Duffield sug-
gests that the validity of either reading of the legislative history will
remain uncertain for at least the near future.10 2 Not content to
await the Court's resolution of the issue, however, Gilmer's oppo-
nents in Congress have introduced a bill that would amend several
statutes, including the ADA and ADEA, to prohibit mandatory
arbitration of employment disputes. 3 The bill has not been
passed to date, nor does it appear to occupy a prominent position
on the congressional agenda. 104
96. Austin, 78 F.3d at 881; see also Beauchamp v. Great West Life Assurance Co.,
918 F. Supp. 1091, 1093-96 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Johnson v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc.,
940 F. Supp. 1447, 1457-58 (D. Minn. 1996) (finding legislative history of § 118, includ-
ing remarks of individual members of Congress and committee reports, non-determi-
native of Congressional intent due to "obvious bias" and "continuous amendment and
supplementation").
97. Id. at 882.
98. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, 966 F. Supp. at 503-04.
99. Id. at 503 (citing 137 CONG. REC. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991)).
100. See id. at 504.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 83.
103. See Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1996, H.R. 983, S. 63, 105th
Cong. (1997). The bill would also amend the FAA to prevent its application to dis-
crimination claims, and would add language to a number of federal employment dis-
crimination statutes, including the ADEA and ADA, making judicial recourse the
exclusive procedure under each covered claim in the absence of a voluntary agree-
ment to arbitrate entered into after such claim has arisen. See id.
104. See 1997 US H.B. 983 (SN); 1997 US S.B. 63 (SN) (Westlaw Congressional Bill
Tracking). The Act was introduced to the House Committee on Education and Labor
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E. Open Issue: The Applicability of the Federal Arbitration
Act to Employment Disputes
Both Gilmer and the 1991 Civil Rights Act left unresolved the
fundamental issue of whether the Federal Arbitration Act (the
"FAA") applies generally to individual contracts of employment. 10 5
Section 1 of the Act provides an exception for "contracts of em-
ployment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. ' 10 6 What re-
mains unclear is whether the FAA's conception of "workers en-
gaged in interstate commerce" comprehends all workers whose
employment impacts upon interstate commerce, or merely that
narrow class of employees engaged directly in the interstate trans-
portation of goods."0 7
The significance of the issue to the question of mandatory arbi-
tration of statutory claims is considerable. If the FAA does apply
generally to employment contracts, arguments attacking the sound-
ness of arbitration as a forum for resolving statutory claims are un-
likely to succeed against the Act's presumption of validity of
arbitration agreements. 10 8 Likewise, application of the FAA argua-
bly would foreclose arguments that policies embodied in federal
discrimination laws against waivers of judicial remedies should
overcome the presumption of arbitrability 09 Conversely, if the
FAA is held not to apply, then Gilmer may be effectively restricted
to applicants in the securities industry or other areas wherein
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims are reached other than
through employment contracts. 110
The vast majority of the circuits have adopted the former view,
and most of those after Gilmer."' On this reading, "workers en-
and the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, but lapsed in both com-
mittees at the adjournment of the 1998 regular session. See id.
105. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1994). The Gilmer Court declined to rule on the scope of
the Section 1 exclusion, because Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate had been secured
through his U-4 application, which Justice White determined did not amount to a
"contract of employment" under Section 1. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
106. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
107. See Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employ-
ment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1363 (1997).
108. See id. at 1362.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 576 (10th Cir. 1998); Pat-
terson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835-37 (8th Cir. 1997); Great W. Mort-
gage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 226-27 (3d. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 299
(1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 357-58 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S.Ct. 295 (1997); Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470-72 (D.C.
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gaged in interstate commerce" include only persons actually em-
ployed in the interstate transportation of goods, rather than all
workers whose employment broadly affects interstate commerce. 12
The Ninth Circuit, however, reflecting its continued disenchant-
ment with Gilmer, has recently reached a contrary result.11 3 Be-
cause Congress's Commerce Clause power at the time of the
FAA's enactment in 1925 was confined to the actual interstate
movement of goods, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress's ex-
emption from Section 1 of the only class of employees it could per-
missibly regulate - that is, employees directly engaged in
interstate commerce - denoted an intent to exclude all employees
from the section's scope." 4
Justice Stevens raised the issue in his dissent from the Gilmer
majority, arguing that Congress intended to exclude from the FAA
all "labor disputes," including the agreement to arbitrate statutory
claims at issue in that case. 1 5 However, the Supreme Court to date
has not ruled on the question. The Ninth Circuit's decision thus
provides a much-needed opportunity for the Court to clarify the
FAA's applicability to this area.
II. Arguments Surrounding Mandatory Arbitration of
Statutory Rights Claims
A. The Case for Mandatory Arbitration
1. Expanded Access to Remedies
One of the more compelling arguments for mandatory arbitra-
tion, stated simply, is that it allows a greater number of aggrieved
employees to have their discrimination claims heard than would
otherwise be the case." 6 This is largely due to the dramatic
proliferation of employment cases in federal and state courts, as
Cir. 1997); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); As-
plundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1995); Ewing v. Virginia
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. du Pont, 443
F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971). But see Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,
Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1.996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 432 (1996) (stating that the
FAA does not apply to collective bargaining agreements).
112. See Estreicher, supra note 107, at 1363.
113. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 161 F.3d 1199, 1206 (1998).
114. See id. at 1202-05.
115. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 38-43.
116. See, e.g., Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPLOYEE
RTs. & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 221 (1997).
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well as the inability of the EEOC to respond effectively to the
surge of discrimination charges in recent years. 17
In 1996, over 23,000 discrimination suits were filed in the federal
courts, accounting for approximately twenty percent of total cases
pending in federal and state courts.118 Furthermore, between 1990
and 1994, federal court filings in employment-related civil rights
suits increased ninety-three percent, from roughly 8,700 cases in
1990 to nearly 16,000 in 1994.119 The average time for resolution of
federal cases is eight months, but in 1994 over nine percent of ac-
tive cases had been pending for over three years.' 20 Moreover, of
the cases filed in 1994, only approximately eight per cent reached
trial. 121
At the same time, many blue collar and non-managerial claim-
ants are unable to secure counsel, who are often reluctant to enter
into a contingent fee arrangement with an employee whose poten-
tial recovery does not justify the substantial time and expense
called for in discovery-intensive discrimination cases. 22 Employ-
ees, then, must generally be prepared to devote a sizable amount of
time, possibly several years, in pursuing discrimination claims in
the courts, and, in many cases, possess the financial wherewithal to
shoulder litigation costs over the same period. 23 Obviously, many
lower-level employees are poorly positioned to meet these
requirements.2 4
Based on similar findings, the Dunlop Commission on the Fu-
ture of Worker-Management Relations ("Dunlop Commission"),
appointed by the Clinton Administration, reported in 1994 that
"the costs and time involved in enforcing public employment rights
through the court system are increasingly denying a broader slice
of American workers meaningful access to employment law pro-
117. See Oppenheimer & Johnstone, supra note 7, at 22.
118. See id.
119. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, UNITED STATES COURTS:
SELECTED REPORTS, Table C 2A, A1-58 (1994).
120. See id. at A1-84.
121. See id. at A1-78.
122. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimina-
tion Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 7-8
(1998).
123. See FitzGibbon, supra note 116, at 247, 255; Jay S. Siegel, Changing Public
Policy: Private Arbitration to Resolve Statutory Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW.
87, 89 (1997).
124. See FitzGibbon, supra note 116, at 247, 255.
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tection.' 112 5 The Commission further noted that plaintiffs tend to
be white-collar, managerial employees rather than lower-level
workers. 26
Furthermore, the number of charges handled by the EEOC rose
from over 73,000 in 1993 to nearly 97,000 in 1994 and again to over
111,000 in 1995.27 On average, claimants must wait one year
before either the EEOC or they themselves, depending on the out-
come of the investigation, may even initiate judicial proceedings.12 8
Consequently, employees seeking to litigate are forced to rely
upon a severely overburdened administrative agency whose re-
sources generally permit action no sooner than a year from the fil-
ing of a charge, and then, most likely, undertakes no more than a
perfunctory investigation of their claims.
By eliminating much of the time and cost required in litigation,
arbitration offers many employees a more realistic opportunity for
redress. Whereas an employee forced to bring his or her claim in
court must often both bear the expense of litigation and wait possi-
bly years for a final disposition of the claim, arbitration is con-
cluded relatively swiftly and inexpensively. 2 9 Thus, for workers
whose potential recovery is unlikely to justify the investment de-
manded by litigation, arbitration offers the most feasible
recourse.130
Moreover, arbitration provides a crucial benefit to aggrieved em-
ployees in facilitating their access to counsel.13 1 The shorter time
frame in which arbitration is conducted, in turn requiring a smaller
financial commitment, makes arbitration, for plaintiffs' attorneys, a
125. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR AND U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 25-26 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT].
126. See id.
127. See EEOC: Commissioners Question General Counsel about Drop in Number
of Cases Litigated, DAILY LAB. REP., Oct. 23, 1996.
128. See FitzGibbon, supra note 116, at 241.
129. See Oppenheimer & Johnstone, supra note 7, at 22. According to one esti-
mate, arbitration as opposed to litigation of employment claims results in a fifty per-
cent cost savings to the parties. See Garry G. Mathiason, Evaluating and Using
Employer-Initiated Arbitration Policies and Agreements: Preparing the Workplace for
the Twenty-First Century, Q227 ALI-ABA 23, 41 (1994). The same study concluded
that the average duration of an arbitration claim is 8.6 months, compared to three to
eight years for litigation claims. See id. (citing study by the Institute for Civil Justice
of the Rand Corporation).
130. See St. Antoine, supra note 122, at 7-8.
131. See id.
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far more attractive setting than litigation for the discrimination
claims of employees with lesser earning power. 132
Apart from making recovery more likely, one commentator has
observed that arbitration offers an additional remedial advantage
over litigation: the greater potential for employee reinstatement. 133
Because arbitration is closer in time to the discriminatory conduct,
the likelihood is greater that the employee will accept reinstate-
ment rather than damages. 34 In contrast, many courts are reluc-
tant to order reinstatement following protracted litigation, by
which time animus between employer and employee has intensi-
fied and the trust required for a solid employment relationship is
irretrievably lost.135
2. Advantages for Employers
A chief benefit of arbitration to employers is the protection it
provides from inconsistent liability in the form of large, emotion-
influenced jury awards and settlements. 136 Prominent examples in-
clude the $50 million in punitive damages assessed by a jury in 1995
against Wal-Mart for a sexual harassment claim, 137 and the $176
million settlement by Texaco with the EEOC after tapes were dis-
covered revealing use of racial epithets by Texaco executives. 38
Such risk is averted by recourse to neutral, dispassionate arbitra-
tors, as well as the absence of generous fee-shifting in arbitration as
provided under federal statutes. 39
3. The Requirement That Arbitration Be Mandatory
These procedural attributes, however, still beg the question: why
should arbitration be mandatory; that is, why should employees be
required to agree to arbitrate prospective discrimination claims as
a condition of employment? The most persuasive response is that
without a mutual obligation to arbitrate, the incentive for employ-
ers to agree to an arbitration scheme is nullified. From the em-
ployer's standpoint, a shortcoming of arbitration is its expansion of
132. See Oppenheimer & Johnstone, supra note 7, at 22.
133. See FitzGibbon, supra note 116, at 245-55.
134. See id. at 251.
135. See id. at 252-53.
136. See id.
137. See Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of Em-
ployment Disputes, 13 LAB LAW. 21, 22 (1997) (citing Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
No. 94-4195-CV-C-5, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9867 (W.D. Mo. June 29, 1995)).
138. See id.
139. See Oppenheimer & Johnstone, supra note 7, at 22.
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the number of disputes by making it easier for employees to bring
claims. 140 What offsets this drawback, however, is the avoidance in
arbitration of the reduced time and expense of litigation. Where
arbitration is voluntary on the employee's part, however, this equi-
librium is upset, because employees remain free to seek large jury
awards in litigation.' 41 Employers naturally will be loath to accept
such an arrangement.
Moreover, voluntary arbitration undermines another advantage
of arbitration to employers - the assurance that disputes will be
resolved with finality in arbitration rather than remain subject to
an appeals process in the courts. When employees retain the op-
tion under a non-compulsory system of pursuing a claim in the
courts, the process loses this promise of closure. Thus, in response
to a speculative discrimination claim, many employers would logi-
cally elect against arbitration and take the gamble that the suit will
be dismissed before judgment. 142
Likewise, mandatory agreements to arbitrate benefit employees
in that employers, too, are required to foreswear litigation in all
cases. 4 3 When arbitration is voluntary, an employer is likely to
arbitrate only those claims that it believes the employee is likely to
win, but will force employees with less certain claims to litigate. 44
By compelling arbitration in every case, mandatory arbitration de-
prives employers of the ability to prevail solely by virtue of their
superior spending power.145
4. Due Process Safeguards in Arbitration
Largely as a response to the due process concerns of the circuit
courts following Gilmer, several prominent legal organizations and
providers of arbitration have promulgated a series of procedural
requirements designed to ensure procedural fairness for discrimi-
nation claimants. Among its recommendations, the Dunlop Com-
mission concluded that arbitration proceedings, as a matter of
fairness and accuracy, should provide the following protections: a
competent arbitrator with knowledge of the laws in question; a rea-
sonable place for the arbitration; a fair and simple method for the
parties to attain information relevant to the dispute; no restriction
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See FitzGibbon, supra note 116, at 248-49.
143. See id. at 249.
144. See id. at 248-49.
145. See id.
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on the right to file charges with administrative agencies; a right to
independent counsel at the option of the employee; a fair method
of cost sharing to ensure affordable access to the system for all em-
ployees; a range of remedies equal to those available through liti-
gation; a written award explaining the arbitrator's decision; and
limited judicial review to ensure that the result is consistent with
the law in question. 146
In line with the Commission's recommendations, in 1995 the
American Bar Association ("ABA") Task Force on Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Employment issued a Due Process Protocol
for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out
of the Employment Relationship. 47 The Protocol adopted the
Task Force's recommendations that employees be permitted repre-
sentation of their choice and limited discovery, and that arbitrators
be empowered to award the same relief as would be available from
a court, racially diverse, and knowledgeable of the statute under
which the claim is brought. 48 The Protocol has since been en-
dorsed by the AAA, ABA, JAMS/Endispute, the National Acad-
emy of Arbitrators, the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution, and the American Civil Liberties Union. 49
Additionally, major providers of ADR services have imple-
mented their own rules of procedure featuring similar protec-
tions.150 In 1996, the American Arbitration Association brought
into force its National Rules for Resolution of Employment Dis-
putes, providing that arbitrators may allow discovery, that the par-
ties bear the same burdens of proof as would apply in court, that
only arbitrators with experience in employment law be appointed,
and that arbitrators provide written opinions in the absence of con-
trary agreement by the parties.' 5' In 1995, JAMS/Endispute estab-
lished similar guidelines.'52
Given the wide acceptance of the Dunlop Commission's recom-
mendations among such organizations, it can be argued that these
146. See DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 125, at 30-31.
147. See Employers Flock to ADR Although Uncertainties Remain, EMPLOYMENT
L. STRATEGIST, Mar. 1996, at 1.
148. See id. However, the Task Force did not reach agreement as to whether agree-
ments to arbitrate statutory claims should be mandatory or voluntary, or at which
point in time such agreements should be reached. See id.
149. See Bompey et al., supra note 137, at 34.
150. See id. at 32-34.
151. See NAT. RULES FOR RESOL. OF EMPLOYMENT DIsP. (AAA, effective June 1,
1996).
152. See JAMS/ENDISPUTE RULES AND PROCS. FOR MEDIATION/ARB. OF EMPLOY-
MENT DISP. (1995).
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due process protections, though perhaps not congruent with those
in the courts, are sufficient enough to counteract the "informality
of arbitral procedure" that so discomforted the Gardner-Denver
Court. 53
B. The Case against Mandatory Arbitration
1. The EEOC Position
In July of 1997, the EEOC issued a policy statement announcing
its opposition to mandatory arbitration agreements. 54 At the core
of the EEOC's position is the notion that enforcement by public
bodies of the federal civil rights laws is critical to their effective-
ness.155 For three principal reasons, mandatory submission of dis-
crimination claims to arbitration "privatizes" the enforcement of
those laws, thereby undermining the crucial public enforcement
function. 56
The first reason cited by the EEOC is that the intrinsically pri-
vate character of arbitration makes it unsuitable for resolution of
discrimination claims. 57 In particular, the EEOC pointed to the
lack of accountability by arbitrators to the public, as well as the
constrained role of the arbitrator in resolving the immediate dis-
pute before him or her rather than "giving force to the public val-
ues reflected in the antidiscrimination laws.' 58 Additionally, the
EEOC expressed concern that the absence of public disclosure of
arbitration decisions in civil rights cases will make it impossible to
identify discriminatory patterns among specific employers or
within particular industries. 159 Further, the EEOC asserted that
the lack of written opinions and limited grounds for judicial rever-
sal in arbitration precludes it from contributing to civil rights juris-
prudence through precedent. 60
Second, the EEOC argued that mandatory arbitration necessar-
ily entails structural biases in favor of employers.' 61 For one, an
employer, which typically submits to arbitration on a frequent basis
over time, is a "repeat player"; the employee, on the other hand, is
a "one-shot player," as a party to arbitration only in his or her par-
153. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58.
154. See EEOC Rejects Mandatory Binding Employment Arbitration, supra note 8.
155. See id. at 11-12.
156. See id. at 12-14.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 12.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 13.
161. See id.
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ticular dispute.162 Hence, the employer will enjoy superior knowl-
edge in selecting arbitrators most likely to reach a result consistent
with its position.1 63 Moreover, the terms of mandatory agreements
to arbitrate are nearly always dictated by the employer, as the
party with greater bargaining power.1 64 Consequently, the em-
ployer "is free to manipulate the arbitral mechanism to its
benefit." 165
Finally, the EEOC asserted that mandatory arbitration impedes
its ability to carry out its congressionally-mandated task of enforc-
ing the civil rights laws. 166 EEOC enforcement is dependent to a
great extent upon reports of discrimination by aggrieved employ-
ees, but employees who sign mandatory agreements may not be
aware of their statutory entitlement to file an EEOC charge.1 67
Even if employees are aware of this right, their incentive to do so is
undercut by their inability to litigate their claims in court
themselves.' 68
2. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
The contention that the legislative history of Section 118 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 evinces an intent to prohibit mandatory
arbitration clauses is perhaps the most forceful argument against
compulsory arbitration. 169 With respect to Title VII and the
ADEA, Section 118 provides:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use
of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding,
minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes
arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by
this title. 7°
162. See id.
163. See id.; see also Lisa B. Bingman, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and
the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 Mc.
GEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998) (analyzing results of empirical studies on the "repeat
player" effect).
164. See EEOC Rejects Mandatory Binding Employment Arbitration, supra note 8,
at 13.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 14.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1194-1200 (determining that "[t]he legislative history
of § 118 unambiguously confirms that Congress sought to codify the law" prior to
Gilmer); Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 201-06 (concluding that the House Reports "re-
solve any doubt on [the] question").
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note.
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The ADA, enacted one year earlier, contains a nearly identical
provision. 171 The most convincing proof that Congress intended
this language to apply only to voluntary agreements are the com-
ments of the House Committees that reported on the legislation. 172
In two House Reports drafted before Gilmer was decided, the Ed-
ucation and Labor and Judiciary Committees admonished that
[t]he use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is in-
tended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by
Title VII. Thus, for example, the Committee believes that any
agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in
the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an em-
ployment contract, does not preclude the affected person from
seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII. 17 3
Similarly, Representative Edwards, the chair of the Education
and Labor Committee, added in the debates just before the pas-
sage of the Act that Section 118
is intended to be consistent with decisions such as Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver ... , which protect employees from being re-
quired to agree in advance to arbitrate disputes under Title VII
and to refrain from exercising their right to seek relief under
Title VII itself. This section contemplates the use of voluntary
arbitration to resolve specific disputes after they have arisen,
not coercive attempts to force employees in advance to forego
statutory rights.174
Representative Edwards further emphasized that "[n]o approval
whatsoever is intended of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Gilmer.'1 75 In other words, the legislative history rejects the dis-
tinction made in Gilmer between CBAs and employment contracts,
applying Gardner-Denver to both types of agreements.176
This interpretation is bolstered by Congress's rejection one year
earlier of a proposed amendment that would have endorsed the
use of mandatory arbitration clauses. 177 The Education and Labor
171. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
172. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1195-96; Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 201.
173. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1991 (Education and Labor
Committee Report); H.R. REP. No. 40(11), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1991 (Judiciary Com-
mittee Report).
174. 137 CONG. REc. H9505-01, *H9530 (1991).
175. Id.
176. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), supra note 173 (stating that "any agreement to
submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from
seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII").
177. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1196; Rosenberg, 995 F.Supp. at 201-02.
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Committee noted its disapproval of the measure's effect of al-
lowing employers to "refuse to hire workers unless they signed a
binding statement waiving all rights to file Title VII complaints. 178
Finally, as the Rosenberg Court recognized, it may be argued
that in order to be read consistently with the other forms of ADR
cited in Section 118, all of which are typically voluntary, so too
must "arbitration" be read as including only voluntary arrange-
ments.1 79 The fact that every other dispute resolution mechanism
listed in the provision is consensual and non-binding lends support
to the contention that Congress aimed to sanction only post-dis-
pute agreements to arbitrate.8
3. Unequal Bargaining Power
Although the EEOC alluded to the disparity of bargaining
power between prospective employee and employer, other critics
have focused not only on the employee's relative impotence, but
also on the employee's inability at the onset of employment to
make strategic legal assessments about a theoretical claim that may
or may not arise at some future point. 18 Employers presumably
will have made the decision to submit to arbitration only after me-
ticulous analysis of the range of legal and economic consequences,
information about which it will likely have superior access. 82 An
employee, by contrast, asked to make an "on-the-spot" waiver of
his or her right to sue, has no option but to make that decision
extemporaneously, and then only on the basis of inexperienced
conjecture as to the ramifications. 8 3
Moreover, employers, aware of such advantages, will quite natu-
rally opt for mandatory arbitration in greater numbers. 8 4 Yet as
the number of employers who do not insist upon such contracts
diminishes, employees increasingly will be left with the Hobson's
choice of accepting these agreements or rejecting employment in
their chosen fields altogether. 185
178. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), supra note 173.
179. See Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 202.
180. See id.
181. See Siegel, supra note 123, at 97-98.
182. See Grodin, supra note 9, at 29.
183. See id.
184. See John-Paul Motley, Note, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements in Employ-
ment Contracts from Gardner-Denver to Austin: The Legal Uncertainty and Why Em-
ployers Should Choose Not to Use Preemployment Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 687, 716 (1998).
185. See id.
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4. Minimal Judicial Review
Equally disturbing to opponents of mandatory arbitration is the
limited availability of judicial review of arbitration decisions, af-
fording the courts, according to this argument, little opportunity to
ensure that civil rights statutes are being applied correctly. 186 In
the 1953 Supreme Court decision Wilko v. Swan,is7 Justice Reed
set forth the dictum that courts are authorized to set aside an arbi-
trator's decision under a federal statute where the decision was
handed down in "manifest disregard of the law. ' 188 Whether this
dictum should be accepted as law has divided the circuits, but on
either side courts refuse to vacate arbitration awards merely be-
cause the arbitrator misapplied or misinterpreted the contract. 18 9
Moreover, the circuits accepting the "manifest disregard" standard
have restricted its application to cases in which an arbitrator writes
an opinion, indicates that he or she understands the applicable law,
but chooses to ignore it.190 It seems unlikely that an arbitrator,
either explicitly or implicitly, will make such an admission.
The FAA provides few additional grounds for reversal, limiting
judicial intervention to instances where a decision is rendered
through fraud or corruption, or where the arbitrator exceeds his or
her jurisdiction.' 91 Thus, even if the FAA is held to apply to em-
ployment contracts, critics argue that federal courts will have very
limited grounds for evaluating the application of federal civil rights
laws to a large number of discrimination cases. 92
5. Race and Gender in Arbitration
Opponents of mandatory arbitration query the impartiality of ar-
bitrators with particular regard to discrimination claims.193 The
reason for this concern is the overwhelmingly white and male com-
position of the arbitrator pools of typical arbitration providers. A
1992 report by the United States General Accounting Office noted
186. See EEOC Rejects Mandatory Binding Employment Arbitration, supra note 8,
at 12-13.
187. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
188. Id. at 436-37.
189. See David E. Feller, Fender Bender or Train Wreck?: The Collision between
Statutory Protection of Individual Employee Rights and the Judicial Revision of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 41 ST. Louis L.J. 561, 571 (1997).
190. See id.
191. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
192. See Feller, supra note 189, at 572.
193. See Miriam A. Cherry, Note, Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Title VII
Disparate Impact Analysis to Invalidate Employment Contracts That Discriminate, 21
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 267, 281 (1998).
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that as of 1992, 89 per cent of New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") arbitrators were male. Further, 97 percent of arbitra-
tors were white, while only .09 percent were African-American, .06
percent were Asian, and 1 percent were designated as "other. '194
The average age of arbitrators for men was 60, and for women,
49.195 The NASD admitted to similar distributions for its arbitra-
tors.196 The implication of this striking homogeneity is that em-
ployment discrimination cases before a NYSE or NASD arbitrator
will almost certainly be heard by a white male at a senior level in
his career.197
Exacerbating such concerns about arbitrator neutrality is the fact
that ninety-two percent of sexual harassment plaintiffs are women,
and similarly, eighty-four percent of racial discrimination plaintiffs
are African-American.198 Given the gross dissimilarity, in terms of
race and gender, between the arbitrator pools of two major arbitra-
tion providers and the preponderance of Title VII plaintiffs, there
is a legitimate argument that arbitration is incapable of handling
discrimination claims with an objectivity equal to that of the
courts.1 9 9
III. Resolution: Adapting Arbitration to Discrimination Claims
Despite the shortcomings highlighted by its detractors, one is
hard pressed to argue that mandatory arbitration does not confer
upon employees a major benefit in providing access to a less costly
forum and augmenting their chances for relief. In this sense, arbi-
tration can be viewed as consonant with one of the fundamental
policies underlying federal discrimination laws, namely, the provi-
sion of a remedy for discriminatory wrongs in the workplace.
Moreover, the acceptance of arbitration by employers is contingent
upon their receipt of a reciprocal advantage in that arbitration be
mandatory. At the same time, however, the inconsistency of, and
largely voluntary compliance with, procedural safeguards in arbi-
tration, as a private enforcement scheme, raise legitimate qualms
about due process for plaintiffs.
194. See HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND HUMAN SERVICES DIVISION, UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED
REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 8 (1994).
195. See id.
196. See id. at 9.
197. See Cherry, supra note 193, at 281.
198. See id. at 299 (citing EEOC National Database, EEOC and FEPA Receipts,
FY 1990-96).
199. See Cherry, supra note 193, at 280-82.
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The most sensible resolution, therefore, would require agencies
administering arbitration to adopt protections along the lines of
those advocated in the ABA's Due Process Protocol. z°0 Such
guidelines, however, should be implemented as a legal require-
ment. The purely discretionary adoption of such provisions by or-
ganizations such as the AAA and JAMS/Endispute is an
inadequate substitute for compulsory application of due process
standards. In this respect, the District of Columbia Circuit, which
reached much the same conclusion in Cole, offered a workable rec-
onciliation of Gilmer with federal civil rights policy.2 01
With an assurance that those protections will apply uniformly,
the due process-based arguments against mandatory arbitration
lose much of their force. To be sure, arbitration, by its nature, can-
not (and should not) reach the level of procedural formality ob-
served in the courts. Yet, where there is certainty that plaintiffs
will have adequate discovery, an equal voice in selecting an arbitra-
tor, will not have to bear the total expense of bringing a claim, and
will be entitled to the same remedies available under federal stat-
utes, any lingering due process concerns should yield to the consid-
eration that arbitration broadens the effect of federal
discrimination statutes by making it feasible for many victimized
employees to bring claims at all.
In addition, with compulsory adoption of due process safe-
guards, the disparity in bargaining power that renders employees
powerless to negotiate the terms of their contracts becomes less
objectionable in the context of mandatory arbitration, because
those safeguards become implied terms of every employment con-
tract. Likewise, employees' relative lack of information is of less
consequence where they are as a matter of right afforded proce-
dural protections analogous, if not identical, to those in court.
As a further protection, arbitration agreements should be re-
quired to provide that arbitrators are to be selected by both par-
ties. The prospect that employers will gain an advantage as "repeat
players" fades where employees, unlikely to agree to arbitrators
before whom the employer has appeared in prior cases, have par-
tial control over the selection process.
200. See supra Part 1I.A.4.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 42-58. In this regard, it is significant that
Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, who wrote the majority opinion in Cole, is a former
law professor and author in the area of labor law, and has been an arbitrator and
member of the National Academy of Arbitrators. See FitzGibbon, supra note 116, at
256.
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Equally critical, however, is the need for ADR providers to re-
dress the lack of diversity among their arbitrator pools. In the ab-
sence of the availability of non-white and female arbitrators,
mandatory arbitration can neither inspire the confidence of Title
VII plaintiffs nor assert an entirely accurate claim of impartiality in
its handling of discrimination claims, particularly in view of the fact
that juries in arbitration are non-existent.20 2 As a starting point,
organizations administering ADR services might consider more ag-
gressive recruitment of female and minority arbitrators with solid
backgrounds in employment law.
Less compelling is the claim that arbitration stymies the goals of
federal policy by "privatizing" discrimination law. By conflating
private enforcement with private interests, this argument assumes a
process in which decisions are rendered without regard to statutory
parameters. Yet cases such as Halligan and Cole, which have
heightened the level of judicial scrutiny of arbitration in discrimi-
203nation cases, as well as general acceptance of the Due Process
Protocol,20 4 suggest the falsity of this assumption. Rather than en-
joying a "free hand," unconstrained by substantive civil rights law,
arbitrators are bound to conform their decisions to statutory re-
quirements. Moreover, the persistent inundation of the federal
courts with employment-related claims, which shows no signs of
abating, ensures that courts will continue to have ample opportu-
nity to develop civil rights jurisprudence and create precedent.
The chief obstacle remaining to proponents, then, is the effect of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act; for if the Act proscribes mandatory arbi-
tration of the statutory claims that it governs, the above discussion
is moot. This is a far more difficult hurdle, as the legislative history
appears to be quite explicit in its disapproval of pre-dispute agree-
ments entered into as a condition of employment.2 5
Two arguments effectively address this issue. First, though the
legislative history is unambiguous in its intent to prohibit coercive
pre-dispute agreements, the statute itself is not. Section 118 simply
authorizes "the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, in-
cluding.., arbitration, 2 0 6 remaining silent as to the timing or con-
text of the arbitration agreement. The omission in the statutory
language of what the Education and Labor and Judiciary Commit-
202. See Cherry, supra note 193, at 281-82.
203. See supra Part I.C.1.
204. See supra Part II.A.4.
205. See supra Part II.B.2.
206. See supra note 79.
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tees emphasized repeatedly in their reports may fairly be viewed as
the absence of intent to address the issue of mandatory arbitration.
It follows that the rejection by Congress of an amendment specifi-
cally endorsing mandatory arbitration proves no more than a fail-
ure to legislate conclusively in the field one way or the other.
Second, even granting that the legislative history does control, it
is by no means evident that all mandatory arbitration provisions
fall within the class of "coercive attempts to force employees in
advance to forego statutory rights" to which Representative Ed-
wards referred in the House debates." 7 Indeed, in cases where the
employee has a genuine choice, both legally and financially, to re-
ject an employment contract, such an agreement can hardly be
characterized as coercive. Moreover, because with the incorpora-
tion of due process protections, substantive federal employment
law governs, mandatory arbitration cannot be said to force employ-
ees to "forego" their rights under federal discrimination laws.
Similarly, in light of the requirement in the Protocol and similar
proposals that arbitration provide for the same remedies as are
available in litigation, mandatory arbitration does in fact "supple-
ment, and not supplant, the remedies provided by Title VII," as
was the concern of the House Committees.0 8 Indeed, the role of
mandatory arbitration as a remedial "supplement" is reflected in
the increased number of Title VII claims that arbitration makes
possible.
Finally, the Committee Reports' instruction that arbitration "not
preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the enforce-
ment provisions of Title VII ' 20 9 leaves some room to argue that
employees are not so precluded, because, again, the arbitrator's de-
cision must be guided by the statute. Given that not all mandatory
arbitration agreements fit the descriptions in the Reports of those
agreements that the 1991 Act excludes, there is a plausible argu-
ment that despite their approval of Gardner-Denver, the Commit-
tees did not aim to prohibit all such provisions.
Conclusion
Because federal discrimination laws are designed to protect fun-
damental individual rights, the ability of arbitration to serve this
end rightly has been subjected to intense scrutiny by both courts
and commentators. With a proper application of due process stan-
207. See supra note 174.
208. See supra note 173.
209. See id.
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dards, however, arbitration is capable of deciding statutory claims
in a manner consistent with federal policy. In view of the inability
of the courts and the EEOC to handle the exponential rise in the
number of employment discrimination claims over the past three
decades, the value of arbitration in providing plaintiffs with an af-
fordable forum and a genuine prospect of securing a remedy out-
weighs concerns about the procedural adequacy of arbitration.
Finally, the benefits of arbitration of statutory claims can only be
brought to fruition where arbitration is mandatory, so that employ-
ers too can be assured of its advantages.
